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1962]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

action, barred from recovering from the tortfeasor. The court held that
where the tortfeasor has, at the time of the settlement, no notice of the
insurer's interest, there is no basis upon which the insurer may later bring
a separate action against the tortfeasor.

CONFLICT OF LAWS
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT -

JUDGMENTS PROCURED BY FRAUD

The full faith and credit clause,' as implemented by Congress,' requires that judicial proceedings shall have the same full faith and credit
in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the state from which they are taken. Consequently, if a
State X judgment may be attacked for fraud in State X, it may be collaterally attacked on the same ground in State y. The principle was
recognized by way of dictum in Schwartz v. Schwartz,4 in which the court
permitted a collateral attack on a New York divorce decree, which, said
the court, could have been set aside in New York.
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT

-

POWER OF ATTORNEY

VOID BY LAW OF PLACE OF MAKING

In Albert v. Sitton5 a promissory note containing a warrant of at-

torney to confess judgment was made in Indiana, although payable at a
designated Ohio bank. By the statutory law of Indiana, such a warrant
A judgment on the warrant of attorney was
of attorney was void.
obtained in Ohio, but the court vacated it, holding that by reason of the
invalidity of the warrant under the law of the place of making, there was
no jurisdiction over the defendant. The court reasoned that making the
note payable in another state or taking it across a state line cannot breathe
life into a warrant of attorney void from its very inception by the law of
the place of making.6
1. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
3. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 76 (1959); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 117 (2d
ed. 1951).
4. 113 Ohio App. 275, 173 N.E.2d 393 (1960). See also discussion in Domestic Relatioos
section, p. 467 in!ra.
5. 170 N.E.2d 925 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
6. No reference was made to Ohio Revised Code section 2323.13 (Supp. 1961), which requires that cognovit notes be reduced to judgment only in the county of execution or of
the promissor's residence. See generally STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 268 (2d ed. 1951);

Note, 44 HAItV. L REv. 1275 (1931); Annot., 19 A.IR.2d 544 (1951).
points out that the authorities are in conflict.
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